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Abstract— In evolving electricity markets, wind generators 
would submit bids to the system operator, with an aim to 
maximize their profits. Generation offered by wind firms is 
highly random, which may result into heavy imbalance charges. 
In markets dominated by wind generators, they would optimize 
their offered bids, considering rival behavior. In oligopolistic 
electricity markets, this strategic behavior can be represented as 
a Stochastic Cournot model. Wind uncertainty is represented by 
scenarios generated using Auto Regressive Moving Average 
(ARMA) model. With a consideration of wind power uncertainty 
and imbalance cost, the expected profit of generators is 
calculated for a practical case study of wind firms located at 
Massachusetts, USA. Nash equilibrium is obtained using payoff 
matrix approach. This bidding strategy mechanism offers 
quantum increase in profit for wind firms, when their behavior is 
modeled in a game theoretic framework. Flexibility of approach 
offers opportunities for its extension to associated challenges. 
Index Terms— Electricity Markets, Nash Equilibrium, 
Stochastic Cournot Model, Wind Power Uncertainty. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Power sector is being restructured worldwide, with an aim 
to improve system efficiency and offer economic solutions. At 
the same time, uncertainties in fossil fuel prices and 
environmental concerns are enhancing the quantum of wind 
power generation [1]. Over the last few decades, governments 
world over are trying to increase the contribution of green 
energy in electricity supply, by providing subsides and support 
schemes [2]. 
Evolving deregulated electricity markets are primarily 
designed for conventional or fossil fuel generators. These 
markets operate on a day-ahead timeline, where participants 
commit their generated power several hours before actual 
power delivery. Eventual power delivered by wind generators 
differs from their initial commitment due to intermittent nature 
of wind. Participants deviating from their committed schedule 
face penalties. Small capacities and random generation restrict 
the wind firms to act as strategic players. They participate in 
the market as ‘price takers’, and are not able to affect the 
market clearing price (MCP). Due to high capital cost and 
imbalance penalties, they cannot operate profitably in pool-
based markets. Therefore, they are forced to sell their power 
through bilateral contracts. 
In pool-based markets, wind generators focus on imbalance 
cost minimization to increase their profits. This can be 
obtained using Stochastic Programming. With a consideration 
of forecasting window length and market closure delay, 
Markov Probability based stochastic model can determine the 
optimal contracted energy level [3, 4]. Probabilistic 
forecasting based methodology can help price-taker wind 
generators to formulate optimal offers [5]. Multistage 
stochastic programming approaches suggest various trading 
floors to derive the best offering strategy for a wind generator 
considering wind and price uncertainties [6]. However, wind 
generators are still assumed to be price-takers. In addition, 
focus is on increasing the wind generator’s profit by bid 
selection, with minimum imbalance cost. Strategic gaming by 
wind generators for bid selection in pool based electricity 
markets has generally been neglected.   
With the present thrust and growth, the wind firms would 
increasingly supply power to an extent of 20% or more of the 
market demand in future [7]. They would participate in pool 
based electricity markets strategically, without any regulatory 
support and benefits. They would tend to increase their profit 
by gaming in the market [8].  
This paper focuses on formulation of optimal offering 
strategy for strategic wind firms, in a market dominated by 
intermittent wind generation. Strategic behavior of wind 
generators in oligopolistic electricity markets, considering 
wind uncertainty, is modeled using Stochastic Cournot model. 
In this model, wind generators aim to maximize profit by 
offering optimal bids, considering rival behavior and perfect 
information. Wind generators are allowed to offer zero 
generation bid. Solution of the proposed model is Nash 
equilibrium, obtained by payoff matrix approach. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the 
market structure, uncertainty characterization, and stochastic 
Cournot model are described. Section III provides 
mathematical modeling of the problem and the simulation 
procedure. Section IV includes numerical and graphical results 
of testing the proposed model through a comprehensive 
The first author acknowledges financial support by UGC Grant No. 39-
894/2010 (SR). 
 
 2 
analysis on three wind firms located at different locations. In 
Section V, relevant conclusions are drawn. 
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
A. Market Structure  
Wind generators participate in pool based day-ahead 
electricity market, cleared several hours before the actual 
power delivery using uniform price auction. Real-time balance 
between supply and demand is maintained by the balancing 
market, few minutes before power delivery. Imbalance 
charges resulting from this balancing market are charged to 
generators causing that system imbalance. In this work, dual 
imbalance price mechanism used for imbalance charging and 
adopted in European markets such as NETA, Nord Pool, 
Iberian Peninsula, etc. has been considered [4-6]. 
B. Uncertainty Characterization 
Stochastic wind speed is considered as a continuous random 
variable, represented by scenarios. Scenarios are possible 
outcomes of the random input, with corresponding occurrence 
probability. To generate wind speed scenarios, statistical time 
series based ARMA model is used. A typical ARMA ( p , q ) 
model is expressed as  
1 1
1 1
p q
t j t t j t
j j
Z Zφ ε θ ε
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= =
= + −∑ ∑                                         (1)                                    
Here, tZ is wind speed scenario at time t  with 
p autoregressive parameters 1 2, ,...., pφ φ φ  and q  moving 
average parameters 1 2, ,......, qθ θ θ . The term tε is a normal 
distributed random number with zero mean and σ standard 
deviation, referred as a white noise or error.  
Generated wind speed scenarios are converted into power 
scenarios, using power curve of wind turbines installed at the 
wind farms. For accurate representation of any stochastic 
process, a large number of scenarios are required. Due to 
computational complexity and time limitations, generated 
scenarios need to be reduced. These reduced scenarios reflect 
expected power generated by the wind firms [9].   
C. Stochastic Cournot Model  
Cournot game theory is a general approach to represent 
strategic behavior of firms in oligopolistic electricity markets. 
Firms make decisions independently and simultaneously, 
without cooperating with each other. With an aim to maximize 
profit, each firm chooses quantity bids to be offered, 
considering rival behavior. Nash equilibrium is a solution of 
Cournot model; this is a standoff condition where no firm can 
unilaterally increase its profit by changing its production level. 
In a deterministic Cournot model, input variables are scalar 
and independent, while in a Stochastic Cournot model, input 
variables are stochastic in nature or dependent on other 
stochastic variables [10-12].  
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
A. Model 
Consider ii N∈  wind firms participating strategically in an 
oligopolistic electricity market. Each firm aims to maximize 
its own profit by offering a certain quantity bid. The profit 
maximization problem of thi  wind firm in a day-ahead 
electricity market is formulated as follows: 
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            Where, itPof , iP  is an offer quantity bid and maximum 
capacity of  thi  wind firm respectively. ( )itP ω  is an expected 
power output in scenario ω  at time t . , ,t t tλ λ λ+ −  are MCP, 
positive imbalance price (PIP) and negative imbalance price 
(NIP) respectively. itx  is a binary variable ensure positive and 
negative imbalance for strategic wind firms.  
The objective function (2) shows the profit of thi wind 
producers, under the assumption that wind power generation 
cost is zero; therefore, expected profit is equal to expected 
revenue. It is assumed that wind firms individually participate 
in the market without any control strategy. Each firm selects 
contracted power itPof , which maximizes its expected profit, 
considering imbalance cost. MCP at time t is determined by 
inverse linear demand curve (5). Demand is the sum of power 
contracted by the wind firms, 
maxt dtKPλ λ= −                                                      (5)            
Where, K is the ratio of maximum value of MCP maxλ to 
demand dmaxP . The maximum power is equal to the installed 
capacity of firms, while the minimum power production is 
considered to be zero. Wind firms do not generate any power 
when wind speed is below cut-in or above cut-out speed of the 
installed turbines. This decision-making problem is formulated 
as a Cournot model, where all firms try to maximize their 
profit by optimizing their offered quantities. In mathematical 
terms, Cournot Nash equilibrium is a vector, which solves a 
collection of profit maximization problems of the form 
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Cournot Nash equilibrium provides optimal offered bids, 
considering behavior of rival wind generators.  
B. Simulation Procedure 
This section describes the procedure used for obtaining the 
solution of proposed Stochastic Cournot model.  
Step 1: Time Counter Initialization: Initialize time counter to 
obtain optimal hourly offers of firms. Time counter 
starts with 1t = . 
Step 2: Scenario Generation and Reduction: Initialize the 
strategic firms’ expected outcome by generation of 
scenarios. For scenario generation and reduction, the 
algorithms proposed in [9] are used. 
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Step 3: Nash Equilibrium: Each firm has discrete set of 
possible offering outputs. They select only one offer 
among possible offers, which maximizes their 
expected profit. To obtain Nash equilibrium, resulted 
payoff matrix constructed having probabilistic 
information about each scenario. For each 
combination in payoff matrix, MCP is calculated 
using (5). For resultant payoff matrix, Nash 
equilibrium is obtained by payoff matrix approach 
[13]. This equilibrium gives optimal power output 
that can be offered by the firms. 
Step 4: Update Time Counter: For each considered hour, offer 
for each firm is obtained. In the next step, update 
time counter by 1t +  and go step 2.  
Step 5: End 
IV. CASE STUDY 
The present section considers a pool-based market, where 
three wind firms interact strategically. The results illustrate 
effectiveness of the proposed model for bidding strategy 
formulation of wind firms. 
A. Data 
The present study considers three wind firms, with an 
installed capacity of 100 MW each. These firms are situated at 
three different locations, Barnstable, Savoy and Kingston, of 
Massachusetts State, USA. Each firm has 40 wind turbines, 
with commercial 2.5 MW, VENSYS100 turbine installed at 
100 m hub height. Air density and temperature conditions are 
assumed same for each installed wind turbine. The used 
turbine model and its power curve are detailed in manufacturer 
database [14]. For all these firms, the actual wind speed data 
of August 2005 is taken, publically available at Wind Energy 
Center, University of Massachusetts, USA [15]. 
B. Results 
Wind uncertainty of each wind firm is characterized by 
scenarios. The estimated parameters time series based ARMA 
model that is used for scenario generation is shown in Table I. 
For accurate modeling of wind power uncertainty, 1000 
scenarios are generated and then reduced to 10 scenarios for 
each firm. From these reduced scenarios, in every hour, each 
firm can formulate their resultant payoff matrix. 
TABLE I 
FIRMS’ TIME SERIES MODEL PARAMETERS 
Parameters Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 
Order ARMA (1,0) ARMA (1,1) ARMA (2,0) 
1φ  0.8693 0.8933 0.6313 
2φ  - - 0.9711 
1θ  - 0.0654 - 
δ  0.5141 0.6048 0.6213 
 
In this work, two cases are considered. First is the base 
case, where each firm offers their forecasted generation. In 
Case II, the firms behave strategically, and offer output power, 
which gives maximum expected profit, as obtained by Nash 
equilibrium. Market operation and imbalance price mechanism 
are same for both the cases. 
C. Case I: Base Case 
In the base case, firms offer power corresponding to 
forecasted outputs. Rival behavior is not considered for offer 
selection. For each firm, the hourly offered bids are shown in 
Fig. 1. At the first hour, power offered by Firm 1, Firm 2 and 
Firm 3 is 47.1143 MW, 51.0163 MW and 48.8089 MW, 
respectively.  
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Fig. 1.  Bid offered by wind firms. 
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Fig. 2.  Imbalance charges for each wind firms. 
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Fig. 3.  MCP and imbalance prices. 
Hourly imbalance charges for each firm are shown in Fig. 2. 
Firm 1 and 2 face negative imbalance charges while Firm 3 
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receives positive imbalance charges because of power offered 
by Firms 1 and 2 exceeds the generated power, while that by 
Firm 3 falls short. Firms 2 and 3 offer zero generation bids at 
22 Hours and at 12, 18, 24 Hours, respectively. At these hours, 
imbalance cost is zero and firms earn revenue for any surplus 
generation. 
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Fig. 4.  Expected profit of firms. 
 
For bids offered with zero generation, imbalance charges 
would either be positive or zero. MCP determined by inverse 
demand curve and imbalance price obtained from imbalance 
mechanism are shown in Fig. 3. Maximum demand is 
considered to be 300 MW and maximum MCP is considered 
as $100/MWh. Demand at any particular hour is equal to the 
sum of power offered by the firms. From these figures, it is 
observed that PIP is less than MCP while NIP is equal to MCP 
during system has surplus generation, and vice versa. The 
expected profit obtained by each firm is shown in Fig. 4. For 
the first hour, profit of Firms 1, 2 and 3 are $523.82, $903.53 
and $3609.96, respectively.  
D. Case II: Strategic Firms 
In this case, the firms behave strategically and consider 
rival behavior for their offer selection. They offer power as per 
Nash equilibrium solution of the proposed Stochastic Cournot 
model.  
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Fig. 5.  Bids offered by strategic wind firms. 
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Fig. 6.  Imbalance charges for each strategic firm. 
0 5 10 15 20 25
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Time (h)
P
ri
ce
 (
$/
M
W
h)
 
 
PIP
MCP
NIP
 
Fig. 7.  MCP and imbalance prices. 
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Fig. 8.  Expected profit profile of strategic firms. 
 
Hourly profile of the power offered by different firms is 
shown in Fig. 5. At the first hour, power offered by Firm 1, 
Firm 2 and Firm 3 are 28.1260 MW, 51.0613 MW and 
48.8089 MW, respectively. Actual generated power for Case I 
is equal to actual historical generation while in Case II it is 
equal to reduced scenarios. Imbalance charges for the firms 
arise due to deviation between offered and generated power, 
as shown in Fig. 6. For the first hour, power generated by Firm 
3 is more than that originally offered, and hence it earns 
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revenue corresponding to this positive imbalance. However, 
power generated by Firms 1 and 2 is less than their offered 
power, and hence have to pay negative imbalance prices. 
Fig. 7 shows hourly imbalance charges for each firm. From 
these figures, it is evident that at the first hour, positive 
imbalance price is lower than both MCP and negative 
imbalance price due to system demand being less than 
generation, Hourly profile of the expected profits, for different 
strategic firms is shown in Fig. 8. At the first hour, profits 
earned by Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3 are $1565.01, $1899.12 
and $3571.92, respectively. 
E. Discussion 
Considering the results obtained from the two cases in the 
first hour, it is evident that the proposed Stochastic Cournot 
model increases the profits earned by different firms and 
reduces the imbalance charges significantly. A comparative 
evaluation of the profits earned by different firms at the first 
hour, as evident from Figs. 4 and 8, shows that the profit of 
Firms 1 and 2 increases by $1041.99 and $995.59 
respectively, while that of Firm 3 decreases by $38.04. This is 
because Firm 1 decreased its offered bid by 18.9883 MW in 
Case II, while the remaining firms did not change their offers, 
as shown Figs. 1 and 5.  The firms behave strategically, and 
change their offered bids, if they have the opportunity to earn 
more revenue.  
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Fig. 9.  Comparative total profit earned by each firm in one day. 
 
As Firm 1 reduced its offered power output, the 
corresponding imbalance charges are also changed. As the 
system demand is considered to be the sum of offered bids, the 
assumed system demand also reduces.  Therefore, in Case II, 
system has surplus generation, while in Case I, the system has 
power shortage. This surplus generation reduces imbalance 
prices shown in Figs. 3 and 7. Imbalance charges for Firms 2 
and 3 are slightly reduced due to imbalance price reduction. 
Due to this, profit of Firm 3 is slightly reduced.  
A consideration of the profit earned by different firms over 
a period of 24 hours is shown in Fig. 9. The overall profit 
earned by different firms increase significantly, when the 
offered bids are selected by the Stochastic Cournot model. A 
comparative reflection of the daily benefit earned by each firm 
clearly shows that the increase in profit earned by different 
firms would be substantial over a longer period of time. 
Simulation are performed on MATLAB® platform with a 
Windows based Personal Computer, 1.73 GHz processor and 
1GB RAM. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In a pool-based market, strategic behavior of wind power 
producers is modeled by a Stochastic Cournot model. Wind 
uncertainty and imbalance costs are considered for evaluating 
the expected profit. Wind uncertainty is represented as 
scenarios generated by ARMA model, which are reduced by 
Simultaneous Backward Reduction method, so as to reduce 
the computational burden. Nash equilibrium is obtained with 
payoff matrix approach. Proposed model is implemented on 
three wind firms located at Massachusetts, USA. A 
comparative study of the two different cases shows that a 
consideration of rival behavior in selecting the bid offers 
results in a significant increase in the firms’ profit. The work 
considers a near-future scenario, when system demand would 
predominantly be supplied by wind generators. The proposed 
model can be improved by considering behavior of 
conventional generators and modeling demand and price 
uncertainty.  
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